Abstract-The Spectre vulnerability in modern processors has been widely reported. The key insight in this vulnerability is that speculative execution in processors can be misused to access secrets speculatively. Subsequently even though the speculatively executed instructions are squashed, the secret may linger in micro-architectural states such as cache, and can potentially be accessed by an attacker via side channels. We propose oo7, a static analysis approach that can mitigate Spectre attacks by detecting potentially vulnerable code snippets in program binaries and protecting them against the attack. We employ control flow extraction, taint analysis and address analysis to detect tainted conditional branches and speculative memory accesses. oo7 can detect all fifteen purpose-built Spectre-vulnerable code patterns [1], whereas Microsoft compiler with Spectre mitigation option can only detect two of them. We also report the results of a large-scale study on applying oo7 to over 500 program binaries (average binary size 261 KB) from different real-world projects. We protect programs against Spectre attack by selectively inserting fences only at vulnerable conditional branches to prevent speculative execution. Our approach is experimentally observed to incur around 4% performance overheads on SPECint 2006 benchmarks. Finally, we demonstrate that our approach is flexible and can be tuned to detect many other emerging Spectre variants, as well as Meltdown and Foreshadow attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Spectre [2] vulnerabilities in processors were revealed in early 2018. The attacks that exploit these vulnerabilities can potentially affect almost all modern processors irrespective of the vendor (Intel, AMD, ARM) and the computer system (desktop, laptop, mobile) as long as the processor performs speculative execution. Speculative execution [3] is an indispensable micro-architectural optimizations for performance enhancement, ubiquitous in almost all modern processors except for the simplest micro-controllers. It is an aggressive optimization where the instructions are executed speculatively, but the temporary results created by the speculatively executed instructions execution are maintained in internal microarchitectural states that cannot be accessed by software. The results are committed to the programmer-visible architectural states (registers and memory) only when the speculation is found to be correct; otherwise, the internal micro-architectural states are flushed. The most common example is that of the conditional branches being predicted in hardware and the instructions along the predicted branch path are executed speculatively. Once the conditional branch direction is resolved, the instructions along the speculative path are squashed in case of wrong prediction.
Spectre attacks exploit speculation to deliberately target the execution of certain "transient" instructions. These transient instructions are speculatively executed, and are tricked to bring in secret data into the cache. These transient instructions are subsequently squashed but the secret remains, for example, in the cache. The attacker then carefully accesses the secret content (that is supposed to be hidden to the outside world) through different micro-architectural covert channels, for example, cache side-channel [4] . The website [5] of Spectre states that "As [Spectre] is not easy to fix, it will haunt us for a long time. " We focus on identifying program binaries that are vulnerable to Spectre attack and patch those binaries with minimal performance overhead as a mitigation technique. We present a comprehensive and scalable solution, called oo7, based on static program analysis. Our solution employs control flow extraction, taint analysis and address analysis at the binary level. Moreover, the analysis needs to model the transient instructions along the speculative path that has never been required in traditional program analysis dealing with only programmer visible execution. We have successfully introduced accurate modeling of speculative execution in oo7.
Once vulnerable code snippets are detected by oo7, we introduce fence instructions at selected program points to prevent speculative execution and thereby protect the code from Spectre attack. We have validated the functional correctness of our protection mechanism with the fifteen litmus test codes from [1] on Intel Xeon platform. We note that the current Spectre mitigation approach introduced by Microsoft C/C++ compiler [6] , detects and protects only 2 out of 15 litmus tests for Spectre vulnerabilities [1] , whereas oo7 can detect all fifteen purpose-built Spectre-vulnerable code patterns. We can launch successful Spectre attack to access arbitrary locations in the victim code prior to the insertion of fence insertions by oo7; but our attempts at Spectre attacks fail after oo7-directed automated identification and patching of the victim code. We experimentally measure the performance overheads from our selective fence insertion and find that the overheads are around 4% on average on SPECint 2006, thereby indicating the practicality of our approach. We also report the results of a large-scale experimental study on applying oo7 to over 500 program binaries (average binary size 261 KB) from different real-world projects.
We demonstrate that oo7 can be tuned to defend against multiple different variants of Spectre attack (see Table I ) that exploit vulnerabilities in the victim code through speculative execution. Moreover, we adapt our approach to detect malicious program binaries that can potentially launch Meltdown and Foreshadow attacks. We also note the limitations of our analysis-based approach in defending against certain variants of Spectre and Foreshadow attacks. The variants that cannot be addressed by oo7 have potential system-level solutions introduced by different vendors with reasonably low overhead. The Spectre variants handled by oo7 with low performance overhead are either not amenable to systemlevel defense mechanisms, incur high performance overhead or escape detection with existing approaches. Thus oo7 approach via binary analysis is complementary to all the other efforts in mitigating the impact of security vulnerabilities due to speculative execution.
Contributions
The contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows. First, we present a program analysis based approach called oo7 for mitigating Spectre attacks. Our solution is based on binary analysis and does not involve changes to the underlying operating system and hardware. It uses taint analysis, address analysis and speculation modeling to check potentially vulnerable program binaries, and inserts a small number of fences to mitigate the risks of Spectre attack. Our approach is accurate in identifying all the litmus tests for Spectre vulnerabilities [1] , has low performance overhead (average 4% overhead for SPECint benchmark suite), and is scalable as evidenced by our analysis of over 500 large program binaries.
We show that our program analysis based approach can detect and mitigate certain variants of Spectre vulnerabilities in the application code, but not all (see Table I ). It can also detect malicious program binaries that can potentially launch Meltdown and Foreshadow attacks. Thus our work provides an understanding of the class of attacks for which an analysis based mitigation may be suitable, and for which a system level solution is suitable.
So far, no Spectre attacks have been found in the wild. We have made oo7 available on request in the public domain from https:// oo7.comp.nus.edu.sg/ . We hope that the search for zero day Spectre attacks in the wild can be substantially accelerated via community participation using our tool.
II. SPECTRE, MELTDOWN, AND FORESHADOW VARIANTS
A number of Spectre, Meltdown, and Foreshaow vulnerabilities that all take advantage of speculative execution in modern processors have been disclosed recently. A summary of these variants appear in Table I . We classify the different vulnerabilities into three categories:
(a) Vulnerability in victim code: Many Spectre attacks rely on vulnerable code snippets inside the victim process and trigger speculative execution of the code snippet to read secret data by supplying carefully selected inputs to the victim process. We detect these vulnerabilities in oo7 by identifying the potentially susceptible code fragments via binary analysis and then introducing fences at selected program points to prevent speculative execution and thereby harden the victim software against any such attacks.
(b) BTB or RSB poisoning: In these Spectre variants, the attacker poisons the Branch Target Buffer (BTB) or Return Stack Buffer (RSB) in the micro-architecture. The victim process, while using the poisoned BTB or the RSB for speculative execution, is then mislead to branch or return to a gadget that leaks the sensitive data. Any indirect branch or return instruction in the victim code is vulnerable to this attack and hence we do not attempt to mitigate these attacks in oo7. There exist potential solutions such as Retpoline [7] or RSB refilling [8] for these vulnerabilities.
(c) Transient out-of order execution: These attacks can be directly launched by a malicious code (malware) without the requirement of any specific vulnerable code fragment or pattern in the victim process. Unlike the first class of attacks where the defense mechanism is to harden the victim software, here oo7 performs malware detection, i.e., it looks for malicious code patterns within a binary.
A. Vulnerability in Victim Code
Spectre Variant 1: The following victim code fragment exhibits Spectre vulnerability Variant 1. In this example, the parameter x is under the attacker control in the sense that x can be influenced by external input. Hence we consider the conditional branch as a Tainted Branch (TB). The attacker first trains the branch predictor to expect that the branch will be true (i.e., the array bound check will pass). The attacker then invokes the code with an input x value outside the bound of array1. The branch predictor expects the branch condition to be true and the CPU speculatively reads y using malicious value x outside the array bound. We call this action Read Secret (RS) because y can be a potential secret that is not legitimately accessible through malicious input without speculation. This is followed by the CPU speculatively accessing array2 using an address that is dependent on the secret y leading to cache state change. We call this action Leak Secret (LS) because the change in the cache state lingers even after the CPU realizes that the branch prediction was wrong and squashes the speculatively executed instructions. The attacker can now launch cache side-channel The idea behind the Spectre Variant 1.1, also known as Bounds Check Bypass Store (BCBS), is to bypass bound check and execute a store instruction speculatively [9] . In the following example, x can potentially be under attacker control, hence, the conditional x < array1_size is a Tainted Branch (TB). However, unlike the Read Secret (RS) in Spectre Variant 1, this variant uses a Speculative Write (SW) to modify arbitrary memory location. For instance, the example modifies an arbitrary memory location pointed by array1[x] when the conditional branch is mispredicted for a value x ≥ array1 size. Although this speculative store is squashed upon resolving the branch outcome, it can leak secret values from the program. For instance, array1[x] may overwrite the return address and transfer control to a gadget that leaks arbitrary secret value via a side-channel (similar to LS in Spectre Variant 1). This vulnerability bypasses the protection enforced by read-only memory, e.g., code pointers [9] . Consider the victim_function_v1.1 where the true valuation of the conditional captures whether x points outside the read-only memory. If x is under attacker control, then the write to a read-only memory can be speculatively executed and modify crucial data structures such as code pointers in the cache. As a result, like Spectre Variant 1.1, the program control may transfer to arbitrary location to execute attacker chosen code. Like Spectre Variant 1.1, this variant also requires the presence of TB and SW.
Spectre Variant 4: Spectre Variant 4, also called Speculative Store Bypass (SSB), is based on the fact that the processor may execute a load instruction speculatively even when a prior store instruction in program order is pending because the address for the store is not yet known. Thus a speculative load may read a stale value that should have been modified by a prior store instruction if they access the same memory address; in that case, the speculative load should be squashed after the store address is known.
oo7 can detect and patch victim binary code with potential Spectre variant 1, 1.1. and 1.2 vulnerabilities. oo7 can potentially handle Spectre variant 4 by identifying the vulnerable code pattern but requires precise address analysis (that the load and the store are accessing the same memory address) that is not supported yet in our framework.
B. BTB or RSB poisoning
Spectre Variant 2: Most architectures support indirect branches in the form of "jmp [r1]". For such jump instructions, the program control is diverted to a location stored in the register r1. For improving program performance, the processor leverage Branch Target Buffer (BTB) to store the frequently used target locations of branch instructions, including indirect branches. An attacker can poison the Branch Target Buffer (BTB) to include its preferred target locations. When the victim executes an indirect branch instruction, it consults this poisoned BTB and the speculative execution can potentially be misled to a target location chosen by the attacker. Any indirect branch is vulnerable to this attack. The indirect branches can be easily identified by static analysis and mitigated by Retpoline [7] approach. Thus we do not consider this variant of Spectre for our analysis based solution.
SpectreRSB: SpectreRSB vulnerability [8] is similar to the Spectre Variant 2. Instead of poisoning the BTB with attacker chosen location, the SpectreRSB vulnerability manipulates the return stack buffer (RSB), which is used by the processor to predict the return address. As a result of a successful exploit, a function may return to an attacker controlled location due to the mis-prediction of the return address inflicted by an attacker. Subsequently, the program may execute arbitrary code in the attacker-controlled location until the return address is finally resolved. All return instructions are potentially vulnerable to such exploit. RSB refilling is a potential approach to mitigate SpectreRSB [8] . We do not consider mitigating this attack in oo7.
C. Transient out-of-order execution
We now discuss the attacks that can be directly launched from the attacker code and without the requirement of any vulnerability in the victim code. All such attack code share the following common features: (i) To exploit the out-oforder execution and illegally access sensitive data (e.g., kernel memory), and (ii) To use a covert channel, e.g., cache to leak the sensitive data read during the first step.
Meltdown, Foreshadow, and Spectre-NG Variant 3a: Meltdown exploits out-of-order execution to read sensitive data, e.g., kernel memory [10] . The basic idea behind Meltdown is shown in the following example. Reading the kernel memory array1[x] raises an exception. However, before the exception is handled, the processor goes ahead with the execution (for performance reasons) and leaks the value of array1[x] via indexing to array2. We note that the leakage of secret is exactly the same as Leak Secret (LS) in Spectre Variant 1. Foreshadow [11] , a more recent variant of Meltdown, exploits the out-of-order execution as described before in Intel SGX [12] . This is to leak the sensitive data from the enclave to the user space. Finally, the exploit Rogue System Register Read (Spectre-NG Variant 3a) exploits out-of-order execution to read system control registers instead of the kernel memory. oo7 can detect all these variants.
Spectre-NG LazyFP: Lazy FPU State Leak [13] is an exploit to illegally read a floating point register in a victim process. In particular, many operating systems today support lazy FPU context switching, where the FPU register states is only restored when necessary, to reduce the context-switch delay incurred in restoring the large floating point registers. Specifically, the operating system tracks the owner of the FPU. When a process that does not own the FPU accesses it the first time, an exception is raised to restore the FPU context for the current process. However, duo to the out-oforder execution, the FPU instruction is still executed in the context of the old owner before the exception is handled. Hence, there is potential leakage of data from the security domain of the old owner to the current process. This feature can be exploited by the attacker to steal sensitive data from the victim process via cache side-channel. In contrast to the basic version of Meltdown, in this attack, the illegal access spans over all floating point registers available in the processor. oo7 can detect this variant.
Foreshadow-NG: Foreshadow-NG [14] is an extension of Foreshadow that exploits the L1 terminal fault to leak sensitive data between the security domains, for example, leakage from victim process space to the attacker process (Foreshadow-OS), leakage from the victim VMs or the hypervisor itself (Foreshadow-VMM). The attacker can use the legal user-space virtual addresses that belong to the attacker process; hence, it is not possible to precisely identify the illegal memory accesses via static analysis. However, it is possible to identify the code that leaks the sensitive data, e.g., the code capturing cache flushes and timing a number of cache accesses when a cache covert channel is used.
oo7 can detect malicious code with the potential to launch Meltdown, Foreshadow, Spectre-NG Variant 3a, and Spectre-NG LazyFP attacks.
III. RELATED WORK

A. Mitigation in the future processors
Intel has reportedly developed hardware fixes [15] in the form of improved process and privilege-level separation for only Spectre Variant 2. Three capabilities: Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation, Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors, Indirect Branche Predictor Barrier will be supported on the future products to mitigate the branch target injection attack. Vladimir et al. [16] proposed DAWG, which is a generic mechanism to isolate the cache side-channel by partitioning the cache ways to limit the data leakage across different secure domains. InvisiSpec [17] is another new architecture design to defend against Spectre-like attacks. InvisiSpec uses a Speculative Buffer (SB) to temporarily hold the data during speculative execution instead of directly loading the data to the cache. The data in SB will be finally visible to the cache hierarchy when the speculative load is safe to be committed. InvisiSpec slows down the execution by 21%. Obviously, both DAWG and InvisiSpec cannot be used in the legacy systems.
B. Mitigation in Legacy systems
Several approaches have been applied to mitigate Spectre and Meltdown in legacy system. Microsoft Visual C/C++ compiler [18] provides a compiling option Qspectre to enable the mitigation of Spectre Variant 1 to insert lfence serializing instruction in the potential vulnerable code locations. However, the mitigation technique can detect only 2 out of the 15 litmus tests proposed by Paul Kocher [1] . Speculative Load hardening [19] mitigates Spectre Variant 1 by inserting hardening instruction sequences that zeros out the pointers that have data dependency with the branch conditions. As it inserts hardening instructions at all conditional branches, the technique involves 36.4% performance overhead. Oleksenko et al. [20] propose the introduction of artificial data dependencies to protect from Spectre attacks. This solution is coarse-grained and will effectively disable speculation between any conditional branch and subsequent load instructions. However, the authors explicitly acknowledge the absence of precise taint tracking and leaves it to the developer to examine whether the potential vulnerable locations reported by the tool can be controlled by the attacker. Microsoft has developed Windows patches [21] through CPU microcode update for Spectre Variant 2 (but not for Variant 1). Moreover, this update has been reported to cause performance overhead (specially on older platforms) and system instability.
Google Chrome has developed "Site isolation" mechanism that sandboxes the memory pages associated with each website to a separate process [22] at the cost of 10-13% memory overhead. In contrast, oo7 does not require either operating system or processor changes. Retpoline [23] has been proposed for the gcc and LLVM compiler to mitigate Spectre version 2. Retpoline replaces vulnerable indirect branches with nonvulnerable instruction sequence that forces the CPU to jump to the real destination instead of the predicted target suggested by the BTB. Recently [24] has proposed the use of symbolic execution and SMT solving for detecting Spectre Variant 1. This is a higher overhead and less scalable approach than ours. Moreover, no mitigation is proposed, as we do by inserting fence instructions.
For Meltdown mitigation, the kernel page-table isolation patch has been enabled in the Linux kernel. This patch is based on [25] that uses independent page tables to isolate the kernel address from the user space. The overhead introduced by this approach is measured to be 0.28% according to [25] , while a Linux developer measured it to be roughly 5% for most workloads and up to 30% in some cases [26] .
Compared with all existing approaches for mitigation in the legacy system, oo7 introduces the lowest performance overhead ( 4% on Specint 2006) as oo7 only hardens a small number of branches in repairing Spectre-like vulnerabilities. Moreover, oo7 is a flexible approach that can be tuned to defend against different variants of Spectre (as shown in this work) as well as detect malicious code fragments for Meltdown and Foreshadow attacks.
IV. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF OUR APPROACH
Our approach to identify vulnerable code fragments for Spectre variants or malicious code fragments for Meltdown and Foreshadow variants proceeds via static taint analysis of program binaries. All input sources are initially marked as tainted. Taint propagation across instructions proceed by usual computation of forward data and control dependencies. Thus, for data dependency based taint propagation, if any of the operands of an instruction are tainted, the result of the instruction is tainted. For control dependency based taint propagation (also called as implicit flows in taint analysis literature), the decision taken by a branch, and hence the instructions conditionally executed owing to the decision are tainted; the identifiers (memory/registers) written by such tainted instructions are also treated as tainted. Details of the formal treatment of the taint propagation policies appear in Section V.
One of the novel aspects of our analysis is in considering speculative execution paths while capturing taint propagation. Conceptually this is handled by considering both possibilities in a branch b, and checking which instructions fall inside the speculative execution window of a branch meaning they can be speculatively executed prior to a branch's outcome being known. There is no need to explicitly maintain the speculatively executed paths as a separate set of bounded length paths, as long as we consider both directions of a branch in our analysis. An instruction i can be speculatively executed pending the outcome of a branch b, only if the distance between i and b is less than the speculative execution window set by the processor.
To check Spectre attack scenarios such as Spectre variant 1, we then need to look for a tainted branch instruction (TB), a load-like instruction which reads secret (RS) with the memory address read by RS being tainted, and RS being potentially speculatively executed owing to TB being un-resolved. Note that once the occurrence of TB and RS are established, the secret data has already been speculatively accessed and can be potentially ex-filtrated via various side channels. However, to establish a potential Spectre variant 1 vulnerability which is consummated via a cache side-channel attack, we need to also establish an instruction LS to leak the secret, where the memory address accessed by LS is dependent on the output of RS. Once again, the detailed treatment of the condition for checking Spectre variant is deferred to the next section.
For forward taint propagation along all possible paths, we use the Binary analysis Platform (BAP) tool [27] . As BAP is based on conservative analysis, it can report false positives. Our approach for detecting Spectre style vulnerabilities is based on BAP, while for Meltdown since we need value set analysis for addresses we have used Angr [28] . Both BAP and Angr leverage a set of techniques to construct the control flow graph for a binary. As is well known in binary analysis literature, accurate construction of control flow graph is a notoriously difficult problem owing to indirect branches. Tools like BAP and Angr use forced execution [29] and other techniques to construct a control flow graph. Forced execution (i.e., execution of both branch directions) is leveraged to construct all possible control flow edges of a branch. As the control flow paths are constructed, taint is propagated along the paths as per the taint sources and taint policies set in our approach (please see next section for details).
On false negatives: As our approach is based on the control flow graph constructed by the underlying tools, we cannot guarantee zero false negatives, if the control flow graph constructed by BAP does not capture all possible flows. In other words, the completeness of our taint analysis is modulo the completeness of the control flow graph extraction in BAP. Also, in BAP, loops are unrolled up to a certain depth and might introduce a source of false negatives in BAP analysis if the unrolling depth is low. However, with correctly provided loop bounds, this problem can be alleviated.
On taint analysis and symbolic execution: In identifying vulnerable code susceptible to many Spectre attack variants, the key is to find attacker controlled branches, and memory locations that can be speculatively read/written pending outcome of attacker controlled branches. For this reason, we have employed static taint analysis and considered read/write instructions that may be speculatively executed within the speculative execution window. It is possible to take a different, albeit higher-overhead approach e.g. instead of capturing the taint propagation along paths, one may summarize the execution behavior in a more fine grained fashion using symbolic execution, where the memory locations accessed by a read/write is captured as symbolic expressions over (tainted) input, instead of simply maintaining that the location accessed by a read/write is tainted. This leads to additional overhead of constraint accumulation and solving. In this way, higher overhead detection approaches can be constructed such as the recent work of [24] that appeared in the public domain six months after our work, and handles Spectre variant 1.
[24] only reports results for different variants of the Spectre litmus tests with few lines of code. As is shown by our experiments, even a low overhead approach like ours consumes high analysis times on a few real-life programs from SPECint and OSS-Fuzz. Hence we feel higher overhead approaches are not scalable enough for possible real-life usage. Furthermore, for any Spectre attack detection approach, it is not enough to detect leaks, the analysis needs to suggest a small number of fences to plug the leak. This is done in our approach. On the other hand, symbolic approaches like [24] simply detect leaks without suggesting concrete fence instructions to harden Spectre vulnerable code.
V. SPECTRE VULNERABILITY DETECTION
To describe our analysis, we use the notations in Table II .
We say that an instruction is tainted, i.e., τ (inst) is true, if and only if the instruction operates on some tainted operands. We will first discuss the checker for Spectre Variant 1.
A. Detecting Spectre Variant 1
An important concept that we need for our analysis is the Speculative Execution Window, abbreviated SEW . We posit that information about SEW needs to be exposed by processor designers for the sake of detecting Spectre attacks. By default, it seems that SEW can be set to the size of the re-order buffer in an out-of-order processor. However, if the size of the re-order buffer is n, it is not sufficient to have a lookahead of n instructions from a tainted conditional branch T B, in our search for memory access RS, in order to detect Spectre attacks. For processor execution, each instruction is decode to a sequence of micro-ops. Each micro-op will occupy one slot of the re-order buffer during execution. However, micro-ops can be fused [30] both within an instruction as well as across instruction. When micro-ops are fused across instructions (also called macro-fusion), the micro-ops of at most two instructions can be fused into a single micro-op. For this reason, if the size of the re-order buffer is n, we conservatively set the Speculative Execution Window to 2n in our analysis, so as to avoid any false negatives in our analysis.
We now elaborate the checking condition for detecting Spectre. oo7 locates TB , RS and LS by checking Φ spectre . Intuitively, the first two lines of Φ spectre capture the presence inst is a branch instruction
inst is an timing instruction, e.g., rdtsc
inst is a memory access instruction
inst is a load instruction addr(inst)
x is data-dependent on instruction inst
set of instructions control-dependent on inst
value located at memory address x SEW Speculative Execution Window = 2n, where n is the size of re-order buffer in the processor of tainted branch instructions TB and tainted memory-access instructions RS and LS . The last line shows that RS and LS are located within the speculation window of TB , and they are data-dependent. Φ spectre reflects Spectre variant 1. Later we show that Φ spectre can easily be changed to detect other Spectre variants e.g. variant 1.1.
B. Taint Analysis
We use taint analysis [27] to determine whether conditional branch instructions (e.g. TB ) and the memory-access instructions (e.g. RS and LS ) can be controlled via untrusted inputs. In the following, we outline the taint propagation policies and rules used to detect Spectre vulnerabilities. To illustrate our taint propagation policy, we use the following kinds of instructions.
• z = x op y : Binary operation on register x and register y. The operation op can be either arithmetic operation (e.g. addition or subtraction) or a logical operation (e.g. a logical comparison).
• y = op x : Unary operation on register x. The operation op can either be arithmetic (e.g. unary minus) or a logical one (e.g. logical negation).
• y = load(x) : Loads value from memory address x to register y.
• y = store(x) : Stores value from register x to memory address y.
• branch(L, x) : Branch to label L if the logical formula x is true.
Taint Propagation Policies:: Initially, all variables that read value from un-trusted sources (e.g., files, network) are tainted. The taint from these variables is then propagated via a welldefined set of rules shown in the following; for each rule, the premises appear on the top of the horizontal bar and the conclusions appear below the horizontal bar. Our taint propagation tracks both data dependencies and control dependencies (also known as implicit flows in taint analysis). Typically such implicit flows come in the form of the tainted data enabling or disabling a branch condition b, and the outcome of b affecting the computation of a variable which would not be tainted otherwise purely by tracking of data dependencies.
Taint Propagation Rules
Taint Propagation Rules:: Based on the discussions in the preceding paragraphs, the taint propagation rules are shown. In the taint propagation rules, we assume that inst captures the current instruction for which the taint propagation is being computed. Write(Tinst) captures the set of operands written by a set of instructions Tinst. We observe how τ (x) is computed for an operand x, where x could be a register, memory location or the value located in a memory location. The last propagation rule captures control dependence based taint tracking. Our taint propagation rules take care to avoid any under-tainting, by considering the forward transitive closure of all control and data dependencies from the taint sources.
C. Detecting other Spectre variants
In the preceding section, we discussed the detection of Spectre variant 1 [2] . Note that Spectre variant 1 can leak the secret data in other ways instead of performing exactly LS action. Such variants can be detected via simple manipulation of Φ spectre :
Our oo7 approach can be fine tuned to detect a variety of other Spectre variants. For instance, consider Spectre Variant 1.1 (cf. Table I ). Such a variant can easily be detected by the following condition:
where store(SW ) captures the presence of a speculative write instruction, as needed to exploit Spectre Variant 1.1. Spectre Variant 1.2 (read-only protection bypass) needs exactly the same condition Φ v1.1 spectre to be satisfied, except that the speculative write (SW ) happens to be in read-only memory. For the rest of the paper, we do not distinguish between Spectre Variant 1.1 and 1.2, as oo7 uses the same condition to detect both the variants.
To detect Spectre Variant 4, we need to check whether a load instruction (RS ) follows a store (WR) to the same address, yet RS can speculatively load a value not yet written by WR. Checking for this condition requires accurate address analysis, more accurate than what we can currently support. We are currently working in this direction.
D. Code repair
Our repair strategy is based on systematically inserting memory fences after each tainted branch (i.e., TB ) in vulnerable code fragments for Spectre variants 1, 1.1 and 1.2. The original article describing Spectre attacks [2] suggests insertion of memory fences following each conditional branch. However, using our analysis, we can obtain the exact sequence TB , RS , LS (for Variant 1) or the sequence TB , SW (for Variant 1.1 and Variant 1.2) vulnerable to Spectre attacks. As a result, we can accurately locate the program point where the memory fence should be inserted. In particular, we insert memory fences following TB instruction and immediately before the execution of RS and SW , respectively, for Spectre Variant 1 and Variant 1.1, 1.2. This prevents execution from loading the secret value into the cache (for Variant 1) and writing to an attacker-controlled location (for Variant 1.1, 1.2) speculatively.
Nevertheless, inserting memory fences may affect the overall program performance. oo7 inserts memory fences only for the branches identified as TB (for variants 1, 1.1 and 1.2). This has less overheads than inserting fences after each conditional branch, or after each tainted conditional branch. We show empirically that such a strategy has acceptable performance overheads of average 4% for SPECint benchmarks.
VI. EVALUATION SETUP
A. Architecture of the tool Figure 1 provides an overview of oo7 tool. oo7 contains two main modules: a vulnerability detection module for detecting the Spectre vulnerabilities, and a code repair module to fix the Spectre vulnerabilities.
We adopt BAP [27] as our primary taint analysis platform (cf. Section V-B). BAP provides a toolkit for implementing automated binary analysis and it supports multiple architectures such as x86, x86-64, ARM, PowerPC, and MIPS. In our oo7 framework, BAP first takes a binary program and the taint sources as inputs. A taint source is an API that imports the data from an un-trusted channel such as network, user input or file reader interface. We consider all user inputs (e.g., via console, file and network) as tainted.
Vulnerability detection module::
The detailed architecture of the vulnerability detection module (cf. Section V) is outlined in Figure 1 .
BAP disassembles and lifts binary code into the RISC-like intermediate representation (IR) named as BAP Instruction Language (BIL). Program analysis is performed using the BIL representation and it is architecture independent. BAP contains a microexecution framework named Primus to interpret a lifted program, a low-level intermediate representation of code created by BAP by lifting the binary.
The core component of Primus is the interpreter. It emulates the execution of a program by using the underlying technology of forced execution [29] .
BAP provides several interfaces to export crucial information to other analysis modules during the interpretation. Such interfaces use a publish/subscribe architecture to watch the interpreter events. The subscribers are allowed to listen to arbitrary changes in the interpreter state (i.e., Global states). During the analysis, BAP wakes up the specific subscriber when analyzing the events registered by the subscriber. For example, the taint engine module is invoked by the interpreter when it completes the interpretation of an instruction (postexecution event). When the subscriber of the taint engine is invoked, it checks the taint data from the taint source and propagates it if the instruction satisfies the taint policy (cf. Section V-B). The Spectre detector module is invoked by BAP interpreter after a branch is executed to check whether it is tainted and whether it is followed by possible speculative load/store instructions as per the Spectre variants. Spectre detector checks the state of the interpreted instruction in the light of satisfying the condition Φ spectre explained in Equation 1.
Vulnerability repair module:: Once a vulnerable code fragment is detected in the binary, we locate the corresponding assembly code for repair. To this end, we first mark the address(es) of Spectre vulnerable code, as obtained during the detection stage of oo7. Concurrently, we obtained the disassembled code from the binary and the assembly code from the source (via "-S" option in gcc compiler). Since most compiler optimizations are employed during the compiling stage, there does not exist substantial difference between the assembly code and the respective disassembled code. This allows us to easily map the disassembled code back to the assembly code and locate the instructions vulnerable to Spectre.
Finally, our repair module directly modifies the assembly code by inserting memory fence instructions in the appropriate location (e.g inserting lfence before RS for mitigating Spectre Variant 1).
B. Subject Programs
We conduct evaluation on three sets of subject programs.
• We first apply oo7 on 15 code examples purpose-built to demonstrate different variations of Spectre vulnerabilities from Paul Kocher's blog post [1] . We call these Litmus Tests.
• Next, we conduct evaluation on SPECint2006 benchmarks, which have been well-studied by the computer architecture community. These are detailed in Table III . We concentrate on complete analysis of the SPECint (integer) benchmark suite because it includes more controlintensive code compared to SPECfp (floating point) and Spectre exploits vulnerability through conditional branches. Specint benchmark suite contains 18.31% branches in the instruction mix compared to only 5.75% for SPECfp [31] .
• Last but not the least, we conduct evaluation with a large number of software projects from Google OSS-Fuzz repository [32] and GitHub. The program binaries in these project include the main application and miscellaneous support tools. Table IV summarizes the characteristics of these projects consisting of a total of 509 program binaries with size ranging from 8.5KB to 21.8MB (average size 261.4KB).
C. Evaluation Platform
We conduct experimental evaluation on Intel Xeon Gold 6126 [33] running at 2.6GHz with 192GB memory. The underlying micro-architecture is Skylake with 224-entry reorder buffer (ROB) [34] . Due to the potential micro-operation fusion in x86 micro-architectures (Section V), we conservatively set the speculative window to twice the effective ROB size, i.e., SEW = 448. Intel Xeon Gold 6126 is equipped with 12 cores and 19.25MB non-inclusive shared last-level cache (LLC) with 64 byte line size. The LLC cache miss penalty is about 200 cycles. Non-inclusive LLC is more secure than the inclusive cache and can thwart certain LLC based side-channel attacks (e.g, Flush+Flush, Prime+Probe). However, it is still vulnerable to the Flush+Reload attack. Thus the Spectre and Meltdown attacks can be potentially carried out in this platform.
VII. EVALUATION RESULTS
Our evaluation investigates three different aspects: 1) Effectiveness How effective is oo7 in detecting Spectre vulnerabilities in program binaries? 2) Analysis Time How long is the oo7 analysis time to detect Spectre vulnerabilities? 3) Performance Overhead How much is the performance overhead introduced by oo7 to protect vulnerable code fragments?
A. Evaluation with Litmus Tests oo7 can correctly identify all code snippets purpose-built with different variations of Spectre vulnerabilities [1] as potential victim code fragments. 14 code examples are identified with taint propagation only along data dependencies. The remaining code example is detected with taint propagation along program (both control and data) dependencies.
The latest Microsoft Visual C++ compiler [6] has integrated /Qspectre switch for mitigating a limited set of potentially vulnerable code patterns related to the Spectre vulnerabilities. Specifically, after compiling an application with /Qspectre enabled, the Visual C++ compiler attempts to insert an lfence instruction upon detecting Spectre code patterns. Paul Kocher [1] has evaluated the Microsoft compiler using the 15 litmus tests. The blog post [1] mentions that only two of the micro-benchmarks are identified and protected by the Visual C++ compiler. In contrast, oo7 can correctly detect all the 15 code examples as potential victims.
The example (v13 [1] ) that requires taint propagation along both control and data dependencies is given below. The branch in the victim function victim_function_v13 is tainted as the return value of is_x_safe(x) is controlled via untrusted input x. However, the return value of is_x_safe(x) is controldependent and not data-dependent on x. Thus oo7 can detect this code pattern as potential vulnerability only if both dataand control-dependent taint propagation are applied.
We design an attacker process to steal secrets via cache sidechannel from the victim process (litmus test example) once the secret data is brought into the cache through Spectre attack. We manage to successfully extract data from arbitrary memory locations in the victim process on our platform. We then allow oo7 to automatically insert lfence instructions at appropriate program locations to prevent speculation in vulnerable code fragments. We verify that the attacker process can no longer extract data from the victim processes running with the oo7 fix.
B. Results on SPECint benchmarks
We use SPECint 2006 CPU benchmark suite [35] to quantify the performance overhead of oo7 protection mechanism, as well as for evaluating the efficacy of our detection and repair. SPECint 2006 benchmark suite contains 12 programs in C and C++. Table III outlines the salient features of these program: the binary size, analysis and repair time, the number of conditional branches, the number of tainted branches TB , the number of TB , RS pairs as well as the number of TB , SW pairs. We note that seven out of twelve programs exhibit the vulnerability pattern of Spectre variant 1 as evidenced by the presence of T B, RS pattern (perlbench, bzip2, gcc, hmmer, sjeng, omnetpp, xalancbmk). By looking for the T B, RS pattern, we conservatively assume the strictest security requirement of reading secret data. The subsequent mechanism to leak the secret data can vary with the most common mechanism being the cache side-channel with T B, RS, LS code pattern. Four of them (perlbench, bzip2, omnetpp, xalancbmk) are vulnerable with Spectre variant 1.1, 1.2 as evidenced by the presence of T B, SW pattern. The analysis time varies from 58 seconds (specrand) to 142 hours (h264ref). The analysis time not only depends on the binary size but also the complexity of the program logic, more specifically, the number of branches. Our repair works on the assembly code and can complete in 15 seconds for these benchmarks.
We evaluate the runtime overhead due to fence insertion by executing each modified program ten times and report the average values. Figure 2 shows the normalized execution time. The average performance overhead is 442.2% when fences are inserted naively at both destinations of all conditional branches. This is the safest strategy in the absence of an accurate program analyzers such as oo7. In contrast, oo7 only inserts fences at detected conditional branches covering Spectre Variants 1, 1.1, 1.2 and oo7 incurs only 4.46% overhead on an average.
C. Evaluation on various software projects
We observe that the detection of Spectre Variant 1 takes the longest time from our experiments with SPECint benchmarks. So we apply oo7 on 509 binaries (Table IV) to detect potential Spectre variant 1 code snippets to evaluate the scalability of our analysis. The column "# of vulnerable programs" in Table IV shows the number of program binaries in each project with potential vulnerabilities. We identify a program as vulnerable if it has at least one T B, RS pattern in the code that can potentially be exploited by the attacker to read secret data, i.e., we conservatively assume the strictest security requirement. As mentioned earlier, the subsequent mechanism to leak the secret data can vary with the most common mechanism being the cache side-channel with T B, RS, LS code pattern. For each project, we report the number of vulnerable programs under two different taint propagation strategies: data dependencies and program (data & control) dependencies. For example, in project samba, out of total 230 programs, oo7 detects 50 and 83 binaries as potential victims under programand data-dependence taint propagations. Program-dependence based taint propagation identifies additional vulnerable code fragments compared to data-dependence only. Altogether, 180 (or 261) out of 509 programs are labeled as potential victims by oo7 under data-(or program-) dependence taint propagation. Table IV also show the analysis time in hours for detecting T B, RS patterns using data dependencies, and program dependencies.
Potential Spectre Vulnerability in Large-scale Code: We show only one example of a Spectre vulnerability unearthed by oo7 in Figure 3 . This code snippet is identified we show only the portions corresponding to the Spectre vulnerability pattern at source code level. As comments, we highlight the code fragments detected as TB , RS and LS . The argument argv is a tainted array read from an external file through the taint source gets(). The conditional check in the function command_lcp is therefore a tainted branch (TB ). Taint is propagated to the function fr_trie_path_lcp via the parameter keylen2. Consequently, the array load lcp_end_bit may use the value of e2 (potentially controlled by the attacker through argv [3] ) during speculative execution. This speculative execution may take place due to the misprediction of the conditional branch in command_lcp that reflects a bound check. Finally, the array access xor2lcp may reveal information out of the boundary of array lcp_end_bit[] via cache side channel. Though the pattern T B, RS, LS is found in the wild by oo7, the vulnerable code fragment is executed only once at run-time, making it impossible for the adversary to poison the branch and launch an attack. The distance between TB and RS is 145 x86 instructions. The example illustrates that Spectre vulnerability in real-world may span over multiple functions requiring inter-procedural program analysis. Table IV under data-and program dependence based taint propagation.
Sensitivity to Speculative Execution Window size:
We set the speculative execution window size SEW = 448 as twice the effective ROB size in our platform. This is a conservative assumption to take care of micro-operation fusion. We investigate the sensitivity of our analysis on SEW value. Figure 4 shows the distance in instructions between TB and RS (∆(T B, RS)) for vulnerable code fragments across all 509 binaries. The results show that 83% and 79% of the tainted memory accesses (RS) occur within 100 instructions from the tainted branch (TB) for data-and program-dependence based taint propagation, respectively. Table IV under data-and program dependence based taint propagation.
Analysis and Repair Time of oo7:
The analysis time depends on the size and complexity of the binary. Figure 5 shows the distribution of analysis time across all the binaries. Under data-dependence based taint propagation, the analysis time is less than 20 minutes for 78% of the binaries. Programdependence based taint propagation increases the analysis time; still the analysis completes within 20 minutes for 55% of the binaries. The repair time is minimal; for all of the 509 binaries, it is within 30 seconds.
Quantitative Analysis of Vulnerabilities: Our analysis shows that on an average only 7.3% (variance 0.3%) of conditional branches are tainted across 238 programs with at least one tainted branch. Moreover, 271 out of 509 binaries do not have any tainted branch at all. Next we check the percentage of conditional branches in that program binary that are tainted (TB) and are followed by tainted memory access (RS) within speculative execution window. If we want to ensure strict security requirements, then lfence instruction should be inserted after all these tainted branches. On an average, our analysis shows only 3.5% (variance 0.3%) of conditional branches satisfy this criteria leading to very low overhead in fixing Spectre vulnerability. Finally, we check the percentage of conditional branches in that program binary that are tainted (TB) and are followed by tainted memory access (RS) within speculative execution window and a subsequent tainted memory access (LS) to leak the data to the cache. This is denoted as TB+RS+LS. If we assume cache side-channel attack as the only mechanism to leak the secret brought into the cache, then oo7 only needs to add lfence instruction after these branches. On an average, only 2.3% of conditional branches (variance 0.1%) satisfy this criteria. This strongly indicates that the performance overhead from inserting fences suggested by our technique will be low. However we could not collect the exact performance overhead for all of these 509 binaries since it will involve running each binary against many inputs and averaging the performance overhead across inputs. Furthermore, for some of the binaries such as coreutils, a large set of inputs (each input being a command) is possible. For this reason, we computed performance overheads on SPEC2006 benchmarks instead, which are standard benchmark suite with inputs specified for performance analysis.
VIII. MELTDOWN-STYLE MALWARE DETECTION
Meltdown-like malware revolves around the idea of accessing unauthorized memory via out-of-order or speculative execution. Subsequently, the value from this memory read is leaked via a covert channel, such as cache. Therefore, the crux of detecting such malware is to discover the existence of an instruction sequence that may perform the aforementioned actions. There exists a variety of covert channels via which a value can be leaked. Cache is a low noise channel and a substantial number of cache side-channel attacks are capable to leak sensitive data. For the sake of simplicity, our following discussion is based on Prime+Probe, one of the most effective and practical cache timing attack. But it can easily be modified to capture other type of cache side-channel attacks such as Flush+Reload [4] .
A. Detection Method
Detecting reads from unauthorized memory address or registers: Let us assume X sup captures the set of memory locations or registers that a user process is unauthorized to access. For Meltdown and Foreshadow attacks (cf . Table I ), X sup spans over the kernel memory and the enclave memory, respectively. For RSRR (Rogue System Register Read) and LazyFP (cf. Table I), X sup captures the set of system registers and floating point registers, respectively. To identify the reading of an unauthorized memory location (Meltdown and Foreshadow attacks (cf. Table I)), we check for an unauthorized memory access (UA) and an instruction to leak the secret (LS ) accessed by UA within the speculation window SEW . The presence of such a pair of instructions UA, LS can be formalized via the following condition Φ secret :
In Equation 4, statically computing addr (U A) involves value analysis [36] . Finally, for Foreshadow-NG [14] attack, the condition addr (U A) ∩ X sup = φ always holds, as X sup might point to any virtual address, yet trick the virtual memory manager (VMM) to launch an unauthorized access to a physical memory page. Thus, oo7 does not attempt to identify malware containing potential Foreshadow-NG attack [14] .
Identifying Prime+Probe cache attack: The basic idea behind Prime+Probe cache attack is to first load a set of cache sets (prime phase) with attacker controlled data before launching the unauthorized memory/register access, as discussed in the preceding paragraph. After the unauthorized access, the attacker times the access to cache sets loaded in the prime phase to determine the secret located in the unauthorized memory/register location.
Let us assume that the set of cache sets primed and probed are S prime and S probe , respectively. Clearly, for a successful Prime+Probe cache attack, S prime ∩ S probe = φ. Consider one such cache set s i ∈ S prime ∩ S probe . We need to check whether cache set s i is subjected to Prime+Probe. An instruction sequence I pri primes a full cache set s i if they fill up all the ways of cache set s i . This is formalized via the following condition:
where ω captures the size of a full cache set s i and the predicate iSeq is evaluated true if and only if the sequence of instructions, as provided via its argument, appear along any valid control flow path.
Probing a cache set requires finding the time to access the cache set. Thus, each probe to cache set s i can be captured via a sequence t s , inst, t e where t s is an instruction to log the time before the probe, inst is the access to probed cache set s i and t e is an instruction to log the time after the probe. An instruction sequence I pro probes a full cache set s i if I pro involves a sequence of triplets of the form t s , inst, t e that also fill up all the ways of s i . Thus, probing cache set s i is captured via the following condition:
To capture the timing of an access, an attacker can use either rdtsc instruction or OS-provided standard APIs.
Detecting the malware: We detect malware containing potential Meltdown or Foreshadow attacks when our analysis identifies an instruction sequence that involves priming a cache set s i , launching an unauthorized access and probing the cache set s i . Consider such an instruction sequence I mal . Thus, I mal will contain a subsequence I pri satisfying Φ si prime , followed by a subsequence I sec satisfying Φ secret (UA, LS ) and terminating in a subsequence I pro satisfying Φ si pro . This is formally categorized as follows: probe (Ipro) (7) where is an ordered composition of instruction sequences. As s i is an arbitrary cache set in Equation 7 , it is a general solution to detect the presence of Prime+Probe via any (set of) cache sets. In general, checking Φ si malware involves value analysis, program dependency analysis and reachability analysis using the program CFG. Finally, although Φ si malware is demonstrated for Prime+Probe attack here, it can easily be modified to capture other type of cache side-channel attacks such as Flush+Reload [4] .
B. Implementation
We have designed the malware detection module on top of the Angr [28] tool. Specifically, we leverage the value set analysis capability of Angr to detect malicious code fragments, as captured via the condition Φ si malware (cf. Equation 7). A crucial step in the Meltdown-style malware is to leak sensitive data through a covert cache side-channel. Recent work, such as SCADET [37] detects Prime+Probe attack. Unlike SCADET, our detection does not only concern the Prime and Probe phase, but also the illegal memory or register accesses.
C. Meltdown Evaluation results
Our implementation can detect the Proof-of-Concept code of Meltdown [38] (using Flush+Reload attack) and a Prime+Probe version of Meltdown modified by us based on the Proof-of-Concept code [38] . We use the same set of programs from the SPECint2006 CPU benchmark suite [35] for evaluating the analysis time of Meltdown-like malware. The result is listed in Table V. Our detection algorithm takes around 578 seconds on average for the SPEC benchmarks.
IX. LIMITATIONS OF OUR APPROACH oo7 demonstrates the possibility of low-overhead Spectre mitigation by judiciously inserting fences while still ensuring safety. Still, oo7 has its limitations. oo7 relies on BAP, which, in turn incorporates a taint analysis engine. The taint analysis statically interprets the code by unrolling the loops up to a certain depth. In order to ensure that our approach does not introduce false negatives we need to pay attention to the following three issues.
• Optimistic loop unrolling may introduce false negatives (missing vulnerabilities) in oo7. However, with correct or worst-case loop bounds supplied to BAP, such a limitation can be mitigated.
• Secondly, taint sources are provided to the taint analysis engine, and if taint sources are under-specified then the taint analysis may not identify all the branches that can be controlled by the attacker. We conservatively assume all user inputs via console, file, and network as taint sources to avoid this problem.
• Finally, the completeness of the control-flow extraction also plays a role to decide whether our analysis will introduce false negatives. If the branch targets of register indirect jumps are not identified, the control flow graph extracted from the binary will not be complete, and as a result the taint analysis results may miss tainted branches. Thus, our approach always depends on the control flow graph being as complete as possible, in trying to ensure that we do not have false negatives in our analysis.
oo7 finds tainted memory accesses following a tainted conditional branch within a fixed speculation window. Incorrect setting of this speculation window size may lead to false positives (window size too big) or false negatives (window size too small). We conservatively set the window length to twice the size of the of the reorder buffer, as explained earlier.
oo7 works on native code for program binaries. We have not investigated Spectre detection on interpreted code.
The capability of taint analysis gives oo7 the flexibility to adapt to various Spectre variants in addition to detecting malware with potential Meltdown or Foreshadow attacks. We have discussed in detail (Section II) the class of Spectre, Meltdown, Foreshadow variants that we can handle and the ones that cannot be handled. In addition, new variants are constantly being found, we could face some variants in future that oo7 cannot be adapted to handle.
X. DISCUSSION
We have built oo7 for detecting Spectre vulnerabilities in binary code and protecting against the attack with minimal overhead. Our approach is employed post-compilation on native code to take into account all the compiler optimizations. No change to the operating system or the processor is needed as the approach proceeds by program analysis. We demonstrate that systematic analysis is useful both for detecting Spectre vulnerabilities and to repair them with minimal performance overhead. Our work shows the importance of exposing selected micro-architectural information for enhanced application security, and can help strengthen the dialogue between architecture and program analysis communities. Our work also provides an understanding of the class of Spectre attacks for which an analysis based mitigation may be suitable, and for which classes of attacks a system level solution is suitable.
For detecting Spectre vulnerabilities in the wild and promote further research in the area, we have made our Spectre vulnerability detection code accessible via the following website https://oo7.comp.nus.edu.sg/ 
